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Abstract
In 1979, Hylland and Zeckhauser [23] gave a simple and general scheme for implementing a one-sided
matching market using the power of a pricing mechanism. Their method has nice properties – it is
incentive compatible in the large and produces an allocation that is Pareto optimal – and hence
it provides an attractive, off-the-shelf method for running an application involving such a market.
With matching markets becoming ever more prevalent and impactful, it is imperative to finally
settle the computational complexity of this scheme.
We present the following partial resolution:
1. A combinatorial, strongly polynomial time algorithm for the dichotomous case, i.e., 0/1 utilities,
and more generally, when each agent’s utilities come from a bi-valued set.
2. An example that has only irrational equilibria, hence proving that this problem is not in PPAD.
3. A proof of membership of the problem in the class FIXP.
4. A proof of membership of the problem of computing an approximate HZ equilibrium in the class
PPAD.
We leave open the (difficult) questions of determining if computing an exact HZ equilibrium is
FIXP-hard and an approximate HZ equilibrium is PPAD-hard.
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1 Introduction
In a brilliant and by-now classic paper, Hylland and Zeckhauser [23] gave a simple and
general scheme for implementing a one-sided matching market using the power of a pricing
mechanism1. Their method produces an allocation that is Pareto optimal, envy-free [23]
1 See Remark 5 for a discussion of the advantages of this mechanism.
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and is incentive compatible in the large [22]. The Hylland-Zeckhauser (HZ) scheme can be
viewed as a marriage between fractional perfect matching and a linear Fisher market, both
of which admit not only polynomial time algorithms but also combinatorial ones. These
facts have enticed numerous researchers over the years to seek an efficient algorithm for the
HZ scheme. The significance of this problem has only grown in recent years, with ever more
diverse and impactful matching markets being launched into our economy, e.g., see [17].
Our work on resolving this problem started with an encouraging sign, when we obtained
a combinatorial, strongly polynomial time algorithm for the dichotomous case, in which all
utilities are 0/1, by melding a prefect matching algorithm with the combinatorial algorithm
of [13] for the linear Fisher market, see Section 4. This algorithm can be extended to solve a
more general problem which we call the bi-valued utilities case, in which each agent’s utilities
can take one of only two values, though the two values can be different for different agents.
However, this approach did not extend any further, as described in the next section.
One-sided matching markets can be classified along two dimensions: whether the utility
functions are cardinal or ordinal, and whether agents have initial endowments or not. Under
this classification, the HZ scheme is (cardinal, no endowments). Section 1.2 gives mechanisms
for the remaining three possibilities as well as their game-theoretic properties. Ordinal and
cardinal utility functions have their individual pros and cons, and neither dominates the
other. Whereas the former are easier to elicit, the latter are far more expressive, enabling an
agent to not only report if she prefers one good to another but also by how much, thereby
producing higher quality allocations as illustrated in Example 1, which is taken from [20].
I Example 1. ([20]) The instance has three types of goods, T1, T2, T3, and these goods are
present in the proportion of (1%, 97%, 2%). Based on their utility functions, the agents
are partitioned into two sets A1 and A2, where A1 constitute 1% of the agents and A2, 99%.
The utility functions of agents in A1 and A2 for the three types of goods are (1, ε, 0) and
(1, 1− ε, 0), respectively, for a small number ε > 0. The main point is that whereas agents
in A2 marginally prefer T1 to T2, those in A1 overwhelmingly prefer T1 to T2. Clearly, the
ordinal utilities of all agents in A1 ∪A2 are the same. Therefore, a mechanism based on such
utilities will not be able to make a distinction between the two types of agents. On the other
hand, the HZ mechanism, which uses cardinal utilities, will fix the price of goods in T3 to be
zero and those in T1 and T2 appropriately so that by-and-large the bundles of A1 and A2
consist of goods from T1 and T2, respectively.
While studying the dichotomous case of two-sided markets, Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5]
called it an “important special case of the bilateral matching problem.” Using the Gallai-
Edmonds decomposition of a bipartite graph, they gave a mechanism that is Pareto optimal
and group strategyproof. They also gave a number of applications of their setting, some of
which are natural applications of one-sided markets as well, e.g., housemates distributing
rooms, having different features, in a house. Furthermore, they say, “Time sharing is the
simplest way to deal fairly with indivisibilities of matching markets: think of a set of workers
sharing their time among a set of employers.” It turns out that the HZ (fractional) equilibrium
allocation is a superior starting point for the problem of designing a randomized time-sharing
mechanism; this is discussed in Remark 5 after introducing the HZ model. Roth, Sonmez
and Unver [29] extended these results to general graph matching under dichotomous utilities;
this setting is applicable to the kidney exchange marketplace.
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1.1 The gamut of possibilities
The most useful solution for practical applications would of course have been a combinatorial,
polynomial time algorithm for the entire scheme. At the outset, this didn’t seem unlikely,
especially in view of the existence of such an algorithm for the dichotomous case. Next we
considered the generalization of the bi-valued utilities case to tri-valued utilities, in particular,
to the case of {0, 12 , 1} utilities. However, even this case appears to be intractable.
Underlying the polynomial time solvability of a linear Fisher market is the property of
weak gross substitutability2. We note that this property is destroyed as soon as one goes
to a slightly more general utility function, namely piecewise-linear, concave and separable
over goods (SPLC utilities), and this case is PPAD-complete3 [32]; the class PPAD was
introduced in [28]. Since equilibrium allocations for the HZ scheme do not satisfy weak gross
substitutability, e.g., see Example 9, we were led us to seek a proof of PPAD-completeness.
A crucial requirement for membership in PPAD is to show that there is always a rational
equilibrium if all parameters of the instance are rational numbers. However, even this is
not true; we found an example which admits only irrational equilibria, see Section 6. This
example consists of four agents and goods, and hence can be viewed as belonging to the
four-valued utilities case; see Remark 17 for other intriguing aspects of this example.
The irrationality of solutions suggests that the appropriate class for this problem is the
class FIXP, introduced in [16]. The proof in [23], showing the existence of an equilibrium, uses
Kakutani’s theorem and does not seem to lend itself in any easy way to showing membership
in FIXP. For this purpose, we give a new proof of the existence of equilibrium. Our proof
defines a suitable Brouwer function which adjusts prices and allocations in case they are not
an equilibrium. It uses elementary arithmetic operations that improve their optimality or
feasibility of the current prices and allocations. The adjustment scheme is such that the only
stable prices and allocations are forced to be equilibria.
Next, we define the notion of an approximate equilibrium. This is still required to be a
fractional perfect matching on agents and goods; agents’ allocations are allowed to be slightly
suboptimal and/or their cost is allowed to slightly exceed the budget of 1 dollar. We show
that the problem of computing such an approximate equilibrium is in PPAD. This involves
relating approximate equilibria to the approximate fixed points of the Brouwer function we
defined for our proof of membership in FIXP. We leave open the questions of determining if
the computation (to desired accuracy) of an exact HZ equilibrium is FIXP-hard, and if the
computation of an approximate HZ equilibrium is PPAD-hard.
1.2 Related work
We first present mechanisms for the remaining three possibilities for the classification of
one-sided matching market mechanisms given in the Introduction. The famous Top Trading
Cycles mechanism is (ordinal, endowments) [30]; it is efficient, strategyproof and core-stable.
Under (ordinal, no endowments) are Random Priority [27], which is strategyproof though
not efficient or envy-free, and Probabilistic Serial [4], which is efficient and envy-free but not
strategyproof. Under (cardinal, endowments) is ε-Approximate ADHZ (for Arrow-Debreu
Hylland-Zeckhauser) scheme [20], which satisfies Pareto optimality, approximate envy-freeness
and incentive compatibility in the large.
2 Namely, if you increase the price of one good, the demand of another good cannot decrease.
3 Independently, PPAD-hardness was also established in [10].
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We are aware of only the following two computational results on the HZ scheme. Using
the algebraic cell decomposition technique of [2], [12] gave a polynomial time algorithm for
computing an equilibrium for an Arrow-Debreu market under piecewise-linear, concave (PLC)
utilities (not necessarily separable over goods) if the number of goods is fixed. One can see
that their algorithm can be adapted to yield a polynomial time algorithm for computing an
equilibrium for the HZ scheme if the number of goods is a fixed constant. Extending these
methods, [1] gave a polynomial time algorithm for the case that the number of agents is a
fixed constant.
There are several results establishing membership and hardness in PPAD and FIXP for
equilibria computation problems in different settings. The quintessential complete problem
for PPAD is 2-Nash [11, 7] and that for FIXP is multiplayer Nash equilibrium [16]. For the
latter problem, computing an approximate equilibrium is PPAD-complete [11].
For the case of market equilibria, in the economics literature, there are two parallel
streams of results: one assumes that an excess demand function is given and the other
assumes a specific class of utility functions. [16] proved FIXP-completeness of Arrow-Debreu
markets whose excess demand functions are algebraic. This result is for the first stream
and it does not establish FIXP-completeness of Arrow-Debreu markets under any specific
class of utility functions. Results for the second stream include proofs of membership in
FIXP for Arrow-Debreu markets under Leontief and piecewise-linear concave (PLC) utility
functions in [35] and [18], respectively. This was followed by a proof of FIXP-hardness for
Arrow-Debreu markets with Leontief and PLC utilities [19]. For the case of Arrow-Debreu
markets with CES (constant elasticity of substitution) utility functions, [9] show membership
in FIXP but leave open FIXP-hardness.
For the CES market problem stated above, computing an approximate equilibrium is
PPAD-complete, and the same holds more generally for a large class of “non-monotonic”
markets [9]. Computing an (exact or approximate) equilibrium under separable, piecewise-
linear, concave (SPLC) utilities for Arrow-Debreu and Fisher markets is also known to be
PPAD-complete [8, 10, 32].
In recent years, several researchers have proposed Hylland-Zeckhauser-type mechanisms
for a number of applications, e.g., see [6, 22, 25, 26]. The basic scheme has also been
generalized in several different directions, including two-sided matching markets, adding
quantitative constraints, and to the setting in which agents have initial endowments of goods
instead of money, see [14, 15].
2 The Hylland-Zeckhauser Scheme
Hylland and Zeckhauser [23] gave a general mechanism for a one-sided matching market
using the power of a pricing mechanism. Their formulation is as follows: Let A = {1, 2, . . . n}
be a set of n agents and G = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of n indivisible goods. The mechanism
will allocate exactly one good to each agent and will have the following two properties:
The allocation produced is Pareto optimal.
The mechanism is incentive compatible in the large.
The Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme is a marriage between linear Fisher market and fractional
perfect matching. The agents will reveal to the mechanism their desires for the goods by
stating their von Neumann-Mogenstern utilities. Let uij represent the utility of agent i for
good j. We will use language from the study of market equilibria to describe the rest of the
formulation. For this purpose, we next define the linear Fisher market model.
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A linear Fisher market consists of a set A = {1, 2, . . . n} of n agents and a set G =
{1, 2, . . . ,m} of m infinitely divisible goods. By fixing the units for each good, we may
assume without loss of generality that there is a unit of each good in the market. Each
agent i has money mi and utility uij for a unit of good j. If xij , 1 ≤ j ≤ m is the bundle
of goods allocated to i, then the utility accrued by i is
∑
j uijxij . Each good j is assigned a
non-negative price, pj . Allocations and prices, x and p, are said to form an equilibrium if
each agent obtains a utility maximizing bundle of goods at prices p and the market clears,
i.e., each good is fully sold and all money of agents is fully spent.
In order to mold the one-sided market into a linear Fisher market, the HZ scheme renders
goods divisible by assuming that there is one unit of probability share of each good. An
allocation to an agent is a collection of probability shares over the goods. Let xij be the
probability share that agent i receives of good j. Then,
∑
j uijxij is the expected utility
accrued by agent i. Each good j has price pj ≥ 0 in this market and each agent has 1
dollar with which it buys probability shares. The entire allocation must form a fractional
perfect matching in the complete bipartite graph over vertex sets A and G as follows: there
is one unit of probability share of each good and the total probability share assigned to
each agent also needs to be one unit. Subject to these constraints, each agent should buy
a utility maximizing bundle of goods having the smallest possible cost. Note that the last
condition is not required in the definition of a linear Fisher market equilibrium. It is needed
here to guarantee that the allocation obtained is Pareto optimal, see [23] for proof of Pareto
optimality. A second departure from the linear Fisher market equilibrium is that in the
latter, each agent i must spend her money mi fully; in the HZ scheme, i need not spend
her entire dollar. Since the allocation is required to form a fractional perfect matching, all
goods are fully sold. We will define these to be equilibrium allocation and prices; we state
this formally below after giving some preliminary definitions.
I Definition 2. Let x and p denote arbitrary (non-negative) allocations and prices of goods.









respectively. We will denote these by size(i), cost(i) and value(i), respectively.
IDefinition 3 (Hylland and Zeckhauser [23]). Allocations and prices (x, p) form an equilibrium
for the one-sided matching market stated above if:
1. The total probability share of each good j is 1 unit, i.e.,
∑
i xij = 1.
2. The size of each agent i’s allocation is 1, i.e., size(i) = 1.
3. The cost of the bundle of each agent is at most 1.
4. Subject to constraints 2 and 3, each agent i maximizes her expected utility at minimum
possible cost, i.e., maximize value(i), subject to size(i) = 1, cost(i) ≤ 1, and lastly, cost(i)
is smallest among all utility-maximizing bundles of i.
Using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, the following is shown:
I Theorem 4 (Hylland and Zeckhauser [23]). Every instance of the one-sided market defined
above admits an equilibrium; moreover, the corresponding allocation is Pareto optimal.
Finally, if this “market” is large enough, no individual agent will be able to improve her
allocation by misreporting utilities nor will she be able to manipulate prices. For this reason,
the HZ scheme is incentive compatible in the large.
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As stated above, Hylland and Zeckhauser view each agent’s allocation as a lottery over
goods. In this viewpoint, agents accrue utility in an expected sense from their allocations.
Once these lotteries are resolved in a manner faithful to the probabilities, an assignment
of indivisible goods will result. The latter can be done using the well-known Theorem of
Birkhoff [3] and von Neumann [34] which states that any doubly stochastic matrix can be
written as a convex combination of permutation matrices, i.e., perfect matchings; moreover,
this decomposition can be obtained efficiently. Next, pick one of these perfect matchings
from the discrete distribution given by coefficients in the convex combination. As is well
known, since the lottery over goods is Pareto optimal ex ante, the integral allocation, viewed
stochastically, will also be Pareto optimal ex post.
Another viewpoint, forwarded by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5], considers the fractional
perfect matching, or equivalently the doubly-stochastic matrix, as the output of the mechan-
ism, i.e., without resorting to randomized rounding. This viewpoint assumes that the agents
are going to “time-share” the goods or resources and the doubly-stochastic matrix, which is
derived from a market mechanism, provides a “fair” way of doing so.
I Remark 5. In their paper studying the dichotomous case of two-sided matching markets,
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [5] state that the preferred way of dealing with indivisibilities
inherent in matching markets is to resort to time sharing using randomization. Their method
builds on the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition of the underlying bipartite graph; this classifies
vertices into three categories: disposable, over-demanded and perfectly matched. This is
a much more coarse insight into the demand structure of vertices than that obtained via
the HZ equilibrium. The latter is the output of a market mechanism in which equilibrium
prices reflect the relative importance of goods in an accurate and precise manner, based
on the utilities declared by buyers, and equilibrium allocations are as equitable as possible
across buyers. Hence the latter yields a more fair and desirable randomized time-sharing
mechanism.
3 Properties of Optimal Allocations and Prices
Let p be given prices which are not necessarily equilibrium prices. An optimal bundle for








xij = 1 (3)∑
j
xijpj ≤ 1 (4)
∀j xij ≥ 0 (5)
Taking µi and αi to be the dual variables corresponding to the two constraints, we get
the dual LP:
min αi + µi (6)
s.t. (7)
∀i, j αipj + µi ≥ uij (8)
αi ≥ 0 (9)
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Clearly µi is unconstrained. µi will be called the offset on i’s utilities. By complementary
slackness, if xij is positive then αipj = uij − µi. All goods j satisfying this equality will
be called optimal goods for agent i. The rest of the goods, called suboptimal, will satisfy
αipj > uij − µi. Obviously an optimal bundle for i must contain only optimal goods.
The parameter µi plays a crucial role in ensuring that i’s optimal bundle satisfies both
size and cost constraints. If a single good is an effective way of satisfying both size and
cost constraints, then µi plays no role and can be set to zero. However, if different goods
are better from the viewpoint of size and cost, then µi attains the right value so they both
become optimal and i buys an appropriate combination. We provide an example below to
illustrate this.
I Example 6. Suppose i has positive utilities for only two goods, j and k, with uij =
10, uik = 2 and their prices are pj = 2, pk = 0.1. Clearly, neither good satisfies both size
and cost constraints optimally: good j is better for the size constraint and k is better for the
cost constraint. If i buys one unit of good j, she spends 2 dollars, thus exceeding her budget.
On the other hand, she can afford to buy 10 units of k, giving her utility of 20; however, she
has far exceeded the size constraint. It turns out that her optimal bundle consists of 9/19
units of j and 10/19 units of k; the costs of these two goods being 18/19 and 1/19 dollars,
respectively. Clearly, her size and cost constraints are both met exactly. Her total utility
from this bundle is 110/19. It is easy to see that αi = 80/19 and µi = 30/19, and for these
settings of the parameters, both goods are optimal.
We next show that equilibrium prices are invariant under the operation of scaling the
difference of prices from 1.
I Lemma 7. Let p be an equilibrium price vector and fix any r > 0. Let p′ be such that
∀j ∈ G, p′j − 1 = r(pj − 1). Then p′ is also an equilibrium price vector.
Proof. Consider an agent i. Clearly,
∑





(rpj − r + 1)xij ≤ 1,
where the last inequality follows by using
∑
j∈G xij = 1. J
Using Lemma 7, it is easy to see that if the allocation x provides optimal bundles to
all agents under prices p then it also does so under p′. In the rest of this paper we will
enforce that the minimum price of a good is zero, thereby fixing the scale. Observe that
the main goal of the Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme is to yield the “correct” allocations to
agents; the prices are simply a vehicle in the market mechanism to achieve this. Hence
arbitrarily fixing the scale does not change the essential nature of the problem. Moreover,
setting the minimum price to zero is standard [23] and can lead to simplifying the equilibrium
computation problem as shown in Remark 8.
I Remark 8. We remark that on the one hand, the offset µi is a key enabler in construing
optimal bundles, on the other, it is also a main source of difficulty in computing equilibria
for the HZ scheme. We identify here an interesting case in which µi = 0 and this difficulty
is mitigated. In particular, this holds for all agents in the dichotomous case presented in
Section 4. Suppose good j is optimal for agent i, uij = 0 and pj = 0, then it is easy to check
that µi = 0. If so, the optimal goods for i are simply the maximum bang-per-buck goods;
the latter notion is replete in market equilibrium papers, e.g., see [13].
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Finally, we extend Example 6 to illustrate that optimal allocations for the Hylland-
Zeckhauser model do not satisfy the weak gross substitutes condition in general.
I Example 9. In Example 6, let us raise the price of k to 0.2 dollars. Then the optimal
allocation for i changes to 4/9 units of j and 5/9 units of k. Notice that the demand for j
went down from 9/19 to 4/9. One way to understand this change is as follows: Let us start
with the old allocation of 10/19 units of k. Clearly, the cost of this allocation of k went up
from 1/19 to 2/19, leaving only 17/19 dollars for j. Therefore size of j needs to be reduced
to 17/38. However, now the sum of the sizes becomes 37/38, i.e., less than a unit. We wish
to increase this to a unit while still keeping cost at a unit. The only way of doing this is to
sell some of the more expensive good and use the money to buy the cheaper good. This is
the reason for the decrease in demand of j.
4 Strongly Polynomial Algorithm for Bi-Valued Utilities
In this section, we will study the restriction of the HZ scheme to the bi-valued utilities case,
which is defined as follows: for each agent i, we are given a set {ai, bi}, where 0 ≤ ai < bi,
and the utilities uij , ∀j ∈ G, are picked from this set. However first, using a perfect matching
algorithm and the combinatorial algorithm [13] for linear Fisher markets, we will give a
strongly polynomial time algorithm for the dichotomous case, i.e., when all utilities uij are
0/1. Next we define the notion of equivalence of utility functions and show that the bi-valued
utilities case is equivalent to the dichotomous case, thereby extending the dichotomous case
algorithm to this case.
We need to clarify that we will not use the main algorithm from [13], which uses the notion
of balanced flows and l2 norm to achieve polynomial running time. Instead, we will use the
“simple algorithm” presented in Section 5 in [13]. Although this algorithm is not proven to be
efficient, the simplified version we define below, called Simplified DPSV Algorithm, is efficient;
in fact it runs in strongly polynomial time, unlike the balanced-flows-based algorithm of [13].
Remark 8 provides an insight into what makes the dichotomous case computationally easier.
We note that recently, [20] gave a rational convex program (RCP) for the dichotomous
case of HZ, and more recently, [33] made a small modification to our algorithm to obtain a
mechanism that is proven to be strategyproof. An RCP, defined in [31], is a nonlinear convex
program all of whose parameters are rational numbers and which always admits a rational
solution in which the denominators are polynomially bounded. An RCP can be solved exactly
in polynomial time using the ellipsoid algorithm and diophantine approximation [21, 24], and
therefore directly implies the existence of a polynomial time algorithm for the underlying
problem.
Notation. We will denote by H = (A,G,E) be the bipartite graph on vertex sets A and
G, and edge set E, with (i, j) ∈ E iff uij = 1. For A′ ⊆ A and G′ ⊆ G, we will denote by
H[A′, G′] the restriction of H to vertex set A′ ∪ G′. If ν is a matching in H, ν ⊆ E, and
(i, j) ∈ ν then we will say that ν(i) = j and ν(j) = i. For any subset S ⊆ A (S ⊆ G), N(S)
will denote the set of neighbors, in G (A), of vertices in S.
If H has a perfect matching, the matter is straightforward as stated in Steps 1a and 1b;
allocations and prices are clearly in equilibrium. For Step 2, we need the following lemma.
I Lemma 10. The following hold:
1. For any set S ⊆ A2, |N(S)| ≥ |S|.
2. For any set S ⊆ G1, |N(S) ∩A1| ≥ |S|.
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Proof.
1. If |N(S)| < |S| then (G1 ∪N(S)) ∪ (A2 − S) is a smaller vertex cover for H, leading to a
contradiction.
2. If |N(S)∩A1| < |S| then (G1 − S)∪ (A2 ∪N(S)) is a smaller vertex cover for H, leading
to a contradiction. J
The first part of Lemma 10 together with Hall’s Theorem implies that a maximum
matching in H[A2, G2] must match all agents. Therefore in Step 2a, each agent i ∈ A2 is
allocated one unit of a unique good from which it derives utility 1 and having price zero;
clearly, this is an optimal bundle of minimum cost for i. The number of goods that will
remain unmatched in G2 at the end of this step is |G2| − |A2|.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for the Dichotomous Case.
1. If H has a perfect matching, say ν, then do:
a. ∀i ∈ A: allocate good ν(i) to i.
b. ∀j ∈ G: pj ← 0. Go to Step 3.
2. Else do:
a. Find a minimum vertex cover in H, say G1 ∪A2, where G1 ⊂ G and A2 ⊂ A.
Let A1 = A−A2 and G2 = G−G1.
b. Find a maximum matching in H[A2, G2], say ν.
c. ∀i ∈ A2: allocate good ν(i) to i.
d. ∀j ∈ G2: pj ← 0.
e. Run the Simplified DPSV Algorithm on agents A1 and goods G1.
f. ∀i ∈ A1: Allocate unmatched goods of G2 to satisfy the size constraint.
3. Output the allocations and prices computed and Halt.
Allocations are computed for agents in A1 as follows. First, Step 2e uses the Simplified
DPSV Algorithm, which we describe below, to compute equilibrium allocations and prices
for the submarket consisting of agents in A1 and goods in G1. At the end of this step, the
money of each agent in A1 is exhausted; however, her allocation may not meet the size
constraint. To achieve the latter, Step 2f allocates the unmatched zero-priced goods from G2
to agents in A1. Clearly, the total deficit in size is |A1| − |G1|. Since this equals |G2| − |A2|,
the market clears at the end of Step 2f. As shown in Lemma 11, each agent in A1 also gets
an optimal bundle of goods of minimum cost.
Let p be the prices of goods in G1 at any point in this algorithm. As a consequence of the
second part of Lemma 10, the equilibrium price of each good in G1 will be at least 1. The
Simplified DPSV algorithm will initialize prices of goods in G1 to 1 and declare all goods
active. The algorithm will always raise prices of active goods uniformly4.
For S ⊆ G1 let p(S) denote the sum of the equilibrium prices of goods in S. A key notion
from [13] is that of a tight set; set S ⊆ G1 is said to be tight if p(S) = |N(S)|, the latter
being the total money of agents in A1 who are interested in goods in S. If set S is tight,
then the local market consisting of goods in S and agents in N(S) clears. To see this, one
needs to use the flow-based procedure given in [13] to show that each agent i ∈ N(S) can
be allocated 1 dollar worth of those goods in S from which it accrues unit utility. Thus
equilibrium has been reached for goods in S.
4 In [13], prices of active goods are raised multiplicatively, which amounts to raising prices of active goods
uniformly for our simplified setting.
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As the algorithm raises prices of all goods in G1, at some point a set S will go tight. The
algorithm then freezes the prices of its goods and removes them from the active set. It then
proceeds to raise the prices of currently active goods until another set goes tight, and so on,
until all goods in G1 are frozen.
We can now explain in what sense we need a “simplified” version of the DPSV algorithm.
Assume that at some point, S ⊂ G1 is frozen and goods in G1−S are active and their prices
are raised. As this happens, agents in A1 − N(S) start preferring goods in S relative to
those in G1 − S. In the general case, at some point, an agent i ∈ (A1 −N(S)) will prefer
a good j ∈ S as much as her other preferred goods. At this point, edge (i, j) is added to
the active graph. As a result, some set S′ ⊆ S, containing j, will not be tight anymore and
will be unfrozen. However, in our setting, the utilities of agents in (A1 −N(S)) for goods in
S is zero, and therefore no new edges are introduced and tight sets never become unfrozen.
Hence the only events of the Simplified DPSV Algorithm are raising of prices and freezing
of sets. Clearly, there will be at most n freezings. One can check details in [13] to see that
the steps executed with each freezing run in strongly polynomial time, hence making the
Simplified DPSV Algorithm a strongly polynomial time algorithm5.
I Lemma 11. Each agent in A1 will get an optimal bundle of goods of minimum cost.
Proof. First note that for agents in A1, there are no utility 1 goods in G2 – this follows
from the fact that no vertices from A1 ∪G2 are in the vertex cover picked. Therefore, for
i ∈ A1, an optimum bundle consists of the cheapest way of obtaining one dollar worth of
goods from N{i}, which are in G1, together with the right amount of zero-priced goods from
G2 to satisfy the size constraint.
Assume that the algorithm freezes k sets, S1, . . . Sk, in that order; the union of these
sets being G1. Let p1, p2, . . . pk be the prices of goods in these sets, respectively. Clearly,
successive freezings will be at higher and higher prices and therefore, 1 ≤ p1 < p2 < . . . < pk,
and for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, pj = |N(Sj)|/|Sj |. If i ∈ N(Sj), the algorithm will allocate 1/pj amount
of goods to i from Sj , costing 1 dollar.
By definition of neighborhood of sets, if i ∈ N(Sj), then i cannot have edges to S1, . . . Sj−1
and can have edges to Sj+1, . . . , Sk. Therefore, the cheapest goods from which it accrues
unit utility are in Sj , the set from which she gets 1 dollar worth of allocation. The rest of
the allocation of i, in order to meet i’s size constraint, will be from G2, which are zero-priced
and from which i gets zero utility. Clearly, i gets an optimal bundle of minimum cost. J
Since all steps of the algorithm, namely finding a maximum matching, a minimum vertex
cover and running the Simplified DPSV Algorithm, can be executed in strongly polynomial
time, we get:
I Lemma 12. The algorithm given finds equilibrium prices and allocations for the dichotomous
case of the Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme. It runs in strongly polynomial time.
I Definition 13. Let I be an instance of the HZ scheme and let the utility function of agent
i be ui = {ui1, ui12, . . . , uin}. Then u′i = {u′i1, u′i12, . . . , u′in} is equivalent to ui if there are
two numbers s > 0 and h ≥ 0 such that for 1 ≤ j ≤ n, u′ij = s · uij + h. The numbers s and
h will be called the scaling factor and shift, respectively.
5 In contrast, in the general case, the number of freezings is not known to be bounded by a polynomial in
n, as stated in [13].
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I Lemma 14. Let I be an instance of the HZ scheme and let the utility function of agent i
be ui. Let u′i be equivalent to ui and let I ′ be the instance obtained by replacing ui by u′i in I.
Then x and p are equilibrium allocation and prices for I if and only if they are also for I ′.
Proof. Let s and h be the scaling factor and shift that transform ui to u′i. By the statement
of the lemma, xi = {xi1, . . . , xin} is an optimal bundle for i at prices p and hence is a solution














where the last equality follows from the fact that
∑n
j=1 xij = 1. Therefore, the objective
function of the second LP is obtained from the first by scaling and shifting. Furthermore,
since the constraints of the two LPs are identical, the optimal solutions of the two LPs are
the same. Finally, for each i ∈ A: the bundle under allocation x is a minimum cost optimal
bundle for I if and only if it is also for I ′. The lemma follows. J
Next, let ui be bi-valued with the two values being 0 ≤ a < b. Obtain u′i from ui by
replacing a by 0 and b by 1. Then, u′i is equivalent to ui, with the shift and scaling being
a and b − a, respectively. Therefore the bi-valued instance can be transformed to a unit
instance, with both having the same equilibria. Now using Lemma 12 we get:
I Theorem 15. There is a strongly polynomial time algorithm for the bi-valued utilities case
of the Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme.
5 Characterizing Optimal Bundles
In this section we give a characterization of optimal bundles for an agent at given prices p
which are not necessarily equilibrium prices. This characterization will be used in Section 6.
Notation. For each agent i, let G∗i ⊆ G denote the set of goods from which i derives
maximum utility, i.e., G∗i = arg maxj∈G{uij}. With respect to an allocation x, let Bi = {j ∈
G | xij > 0}, i.e., the set of goods in i’s bundle.
We identify the following four types of optimal bundles.
Type A bundles: αi = 0 and cost(i) < 1.
By complementary slackness, optimal goods will satisfy uij = µi and suboptimal goods
will satisfy uij < µi. Hence the set of optimal goods is G∗i and Bi ⊆ G∗i . Note that the prices
of goods in Bi can be arbitrary, as long as cost(i) < 1.
Type B bundles: αi = 0 and cost(i) = 1.
The only difference from the previous type is that cost(i) is exactly 1.
Type C bundles: αi > 0 and all optimal goods for i have the same utility.
Recall that good j is optimal for i if6 αipj = uij − µi. Suppose goods j and k are both
optimal. Then uij = uik and αipj = uij − µi = uik − µi = αipk, i.e., pj = pk. Since αi > 0,
6 Note that under this case, optimal goods are not necessarily maximum utility goods; the latter may be
suboptimal because their prices are too high.
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by complementary slackness, cost(i) = 1. Further, since size(i) = 1, we get that each optimal
good has price 1.
Type D bundles: αi > 0 and not all optimal goods for i have the same utility.
Suppose goods j and k are both optimal and uij 6= uik. Then αipj = uij − µi 6=
uik − µi = αipk, i.e., pj 6= pk. Therefore optimal goods have at least two different prices.
Since αi > 0, by complementary slackness, cost(i) = 1. Further, since size(i) = 1, there must
be an optimal good with price more than 1 and an optimal good with price less than 1.
Finally, if good z is suboptimal for i, then αipz < uiz − µi.
6 An Example Having Only Irrational Equilibria
Our example has 4 agents A1, . . . , A4 and 4 goods g1, . . . , g47. The agents’ utilities for the
goods are given in Table 1, with rows corresponding to agents and columns to goods.
Table 1 Agents’ utilities.
g1 g2 g3 g4
A1 2 4 0 8
A2 2 3 0 8
A3 2 0 5 0
A4 0 4 5 0
Thus, agents A1 and A2 like, to varying degrees, three goods only, g1, g2, g4, while agents
A3 and A4 like two goods each, {g1, g3} and {g2, g3}, respectively. The precise values of the
utilities are not that important; the important aspects are: which goods each agent likes, the
order between them, and the ratios u14−u12u12−u11 and
u24−u22
u22−u21 . Notice that the latter are unequal.
We show that this example has a unique equilibrium solution with minimum price 0. In
this solution, good g1 has price 0, and all the other goods have positive irrational values.
Agents A1, A3 and A4 buy the goods that they like, and A2 buys g1 and g4 only.
Specifically, we show the following:
I Theorem 16. The stated instance has a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the
allocations to agents and prices of goods, other than the zero-priced good, are all irrational
numbers. The prices are as follows:
p1 = 0, p2 = (23−
√
17)/32, p3 = (9 +
√
17)/8, p4 = (69− 3
√
17)/32.
Letting ri = |1− pi|, the allocations xij of each good gj to each agent Ai are as follows:
A1 : x11 = 1−
r3
1 + r3




, x13 = 0, x14 =
r4
1 + r4
A2 : x21 =
r4
1 + r4
, x22 = 0, x23 = 0, x24 =
1
1 + r4
A3 : x31 =
r3
1 + r3
, x32 = 0, x33 =
1
1 + r3
, x34 = 0






, x44 = 0
7 It can be shown, by analyzing relations in the bipartite graph on agents and goods with edges
corresponding to non-zero allocations, that any instance with 3 agents and 3 goods and rational utilities
has a rational equilibrium.
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The proof of the theorem is given in the full paper. Even for a small instance like this
one, the analysis of the HZ equilibria is not simple. We outline here the main steps. Consider
any equilibrium with minimum price 0. We first analyze qualitatively the prices of the goods
with respect to 0 and 1: We show that the zero-priced good must be good 1; good 2 must
have price strictly between 0 and 1, and goods 3 and 4 must have price strictly greater than
1. Next we characterize qualitatively which goods are bought in non-zero quantity by each
agent: We show that every agent buys only goods that she likes. Agents A3 and A4 buy
both goods that they like, but only one of agents A1, A2 buys all three goods that she likes.
If A1 buys g1, g2, g4, then A2 buys only g1, g4. If A2 buys g1, g2, g4, then A1 buys only g2, g4.
Finally, we analyze quantitatively each of these two cases. In each case, we show that the
prices satisfy a system of (nonlinear) equations, and the system has a unique nonnegative
solution. Furthermore, the prices determine uniquely the allocation. In the first case where
A1 buys all three goods that she likes, the unique solution and the corresponding allocations
are as given in the Theorem. In the second case where agent A2 buys all three goods, we show
that there is no equilibrium: the unique prices that satisfy the equations yield allocations
that violate the market clearance conditions (a good is oversold). The analysis uses heavily
the primal-dual complementary slackness equations. We refer to the full paper for the details.
I Remark 17. Observe that in the equilibrium, the allocations of all four agents are irrational
even though each one of them spends their dollar completely and the allocations form a
fractional perfect matching, i.e., add up to 1 for each good and each agent.
7 Membership of Exact Equilibrium in FIXP
In this section, we will prove that the problem of computing an HZ equilibrium lies in the
class FIXP, which was introduced in [16]. This is the class of problems that can be cast, in
polynomial time, as the problem of computing a fixed point of an algebraic Brouwer function.
Recall that basic complexity classes, such as P, NP, NC and #P, are defined via machine
models. For the class FIXP, the role of “machine model” is played by one of the following: a
straight line program, an algebraic formula, or a circuit; further it must use the standard
arithmetic operations of +, - * /, min and max. We will establish membership in FIXP using
straight line programs. Such a program should satisfy the following:
1. The program does not have any conditional statements, such as if ... then ... else.
2. It uses the standard arithmetic operations of +, - * /, min and max.
3. It never attempts to divide by zero.
A total problem is one which always has a solution, e.g., Nash equilibrium and Hylland-
Zeckhauser equilibrium. A total problem is in FIXP if there is a polynomial time algorithm
which given an instance I of length |I| = n, outputs a polynomial sized straight line program
which computes a function FI on a closed, convex, real-valued domain D(n) satisfying: each
fixed point of FI is a solution to instance I.
Let p and x denote the allocation and price variables. We will give a function F over these
variables and a closed, compact, real-valued domain D for F . The function will be specified
by a polynomial length straight line program using the algebraic operations of +,−, ∗, /,min
and max, hence guaranteeing that it is continuous. We will prove that all fixed points of F
are equilibrium allocations and prices, hence proving that Hylland-Zeckhauser is in FIXP.
Notation. We denote the set {1, . . . .n} by [n]. xi denotes agent i’s bundle. For each agent
i, choose one good from G∗i and denote it by i∗. If e is an expression, we will use (e)+ as a
shorthand for max{0, e}.
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Domain D = Dp × Dx, where Dp and Dx are the domains for p and x, respectively,
with Dp = {p | ∀j ∈ [n], pj ∈ [0, n]} and Dx = {x | ∀i ∈ [n],
∑
j∈G xij = 1, and ∀i, j ∈ [n],
xij ≥ 0}.
Let (p′, x′) = F (p, x). (p, x) can be viewed as being composed of n+1 vectors of variables,
namely p and for each i ∈ [n], xi. Similarly, we will view F as being composed of n + 1
functions, Fp and for each i ∈ [n], Fi, where p′ = Fp(p, x) and for each i ∈ [n], x′i = Fi(p, x).
The straight line programs for Fp and Fi are given in the figures below.
It is easy to see that if Fi alters a bundle, the new bundle still remains in the domain; in
particular, ∀i ∈ [n], size(i) = 1. Similarly, it is easy to see that the output of Fp is in the
domain Dp.
Requirements on equilibria. Observe that (p, x) will be an equilibrium for the market if, in
addition to the conditions imposed by the domain, it satisfies the following:
1. ∀j ∈ [n],
∑
i∈A xij = 1.
2. ∀i ∈ [n], cost(i) ≤ 1.
3. ∀i ∈ [n], xi is an optimal bundle for i. Furthermore, cost(i) is minimum over all optimal
bundles.
Function F has been constructed in such a way that if any of these conditions is not
satisfied by (p, x), then F (p, x) 6= (p, x), i.e., (p, x) is not a fixed point of F . Equivalently,
we show that every fixed point of F must satisfy all these conditions and is therefore an
equilibrium. The converse also holds. That is, we show:
I Lemma 18. Every fixed point (x, p) of F is an equilibrium of the matching market.
Conversely, every equilibrium (p, x), where some good has price 0, is a fixed point of F .
Algorithm 2 Straight line program for function Fp.
1. For all j ∈ [n] do: pj ← min{n,max{0, pj +
∑
i∈A xij − 1}}
2. r ← minj∈[n]{pj}
3. For all j ∈ [n] do: pj ← pj − r
The proof of correctness for the function F is nontrivial, and is given in the full paper.
The proof makes essential use of the characterization of the optimal bundles from Section
5. We first show that F has the following key property: if (p, x) is a fixed point, then no
step of F will change (p, x), i.e., it couldn’t be that some step(s) of F change (p, x) and
some other step(s) change it back, restoring it to (p, x). This is easy to check for Fp. The
proof for Fi is more delicate and uses a potential function argument based on the changes
in value(i) =
∑
j uijxij and cost(i) =
∑
j pjxij caused by any change in the allocation xi in
every step of the algorithm for Fi. Given the key property, we then show that if a pair (x, p)
does not satisfy one of the equilibrium requirements, then some step of F will change (x, p),
hence (x, p) is not a fixed point. We refer to the full paper for the details of the proofs.
Thus, we have:
I Theorem 19. The problem of computing an exact equilibrium for the Hylland-Zeckhauser
scheme is in FIXP.
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Algorithm 3 Straight line program for function Fi.
1. r ← (
∑
j pjxij − 1)+.






4. For all k /∈ G∗i do:
a. d← min{xik, tn2 }
b. xik ← xik − d
c. xii∗ := xii∗ + d
5. For all pairs j, k of goods s.t. uij ≤ uik do:
a. d← min{xij , (pj − pk)+}
b. xij ← xij − d/n
c. xik ← xik + d/n
6. For all triples j, k, l of goods such that uij < uik < uil do:
a. d← min{xik, ((uil − uik)(pk − pj)− (uik − uij)(pl − pk))+}
b. xik ← xik − d
c. xij ← xij + uil−uikuil−uij d
d. xil ← xil + uik−uijuil−uij d
7. For all triples j, k, l of goods such that uij < uik < uil do:
a. d := min(xij , xil, ((uik − uij)(pl − pk)− (uil − uik)(pk − pj))+)
b. xik := xik + d
c. xij := xij − uil−uikuil−uij d
d. xil := xil − uik−uijuil−uij d
8 Membership of Approximate Equilibrium in PPAD
In this section we define approximate equilibria, and show that the problem of computing an
approximate equilibrium is in PPAD.
First let us scale the utilities of all the agents so that they lie in [0, 1]. This can be done
clearly without loss of generality without changing the equilibria.
I Definition 20. A pair (p, x) of (non-negative) prices and allocations is an ε-approximate
equilibrium for a given one-sided market if:
1. The total probability share of each good j is 1 unit, i.e.,
∑
i xij = 1.
2. The size of each agent i’s allocation is 1, i.e., size(i) = 1.
3. The cost of the allocation of each agent is at most 1 + ε.
4. The value of the allocation of each agent i is at least v∗(i)− ε where v∗(i) is the value
of the optimal bundle for agent i under prices p, i.e. the optimal value of the program:
maximize value(i), subject to size(i) = 1 and cost(i) ≤ 1. Furthermore, we require that
the cost of the allocation xi is at most c∗(i) − ε, where c∗(i) is the minimum cost of a
bundle for agent i that has the maximum value v∗(i).
The corresponding computational problem is: Given a one-sided matching market M
and a rational ε > 0 (in binary as usual), compute an ε-approximate equilibrium for M .
Polynomial time in this context means time that is polynomial in the encoding size of the
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marketM and log(1/ε). We define also a more relaxed version, called a relaxed ε-approximate
equilibrium where condition 1 is relaxed to |
∑
i xij − 1| ≤ ε for all goods j. It is easy to see
that the two versions are polynomially equivalent, i.e., if one can be solved in polynomial
time then so can the other.
I Proposition 21. The problems of computing an ε-approximate equilibrium and a relaxed
approximate equilibrium are polynomially equivalent.
Note however, that in general an ε-approximate equilibrium may not be close to an actual
equilibrium of the matching market. This phenomenon is similar to the case of market
equilibria for the standard exchange markets and to the case of Nash equilibria for games.
We will show membership of the approximate equilibrium problem in PPAD by showing
that a relaxed approximate equilibrium can be obtained from an approximate fixed point of
a variant of the function F defined in Section 7.
I Definition 22. A weak ε-approximate fixed point of a function F (or weak ε-fixed point
for short) is a point x such that ||F (x)− x||∞ ≤ ε.
Let F be a family of functions, where each function FI in F corresponds to an instance I
of a problem (in our case a one-sided matching market) that is encoded as usual by a string.
The function FI maps a domain DI , to itself. We assume that DI is a polytope defined
by a set of linear inequalities with rational coefficients which can be computed from I in
polynomial time; this clearly holds for our problem. We use |I| to denote the length of the
encoding of an instance I (i.e., the length of the string). If x is a rational vector, we use
size(x) to denote the number of bits in a binary representation of x.
I Definition 23. A family F of functions is polynomially computable if there is a polynomial
q and an algorithm that, given the string encoding I of a function FI ∈ F and a rational
point x ∈ DI , computes FI(x) in time q(|I|+ size(x)).
A family F of functions is polynomially continuous if there is a polynomial q such that for
every FI ∈ F and every rational ε > 0 there is a rational δ such that log(1/δ) ≤ q(|I|+log(1/ε))
and such that ||x− y||∞ ≤ δ implies ||FI(x)− FI(y)||∞ ≤ ε for all x, y ∈ DI .
It was shown in [16] that, if a family of functions is polynomially computable and
polynomially continuous, then the corresponding weak approximate fixed point problem
(given I and rational δ > 0, compute a weak δ-approximate fixed point of FI) is in PPAD.
The family F of functions for the online matching market problem defined in Section 7 is
obviously polynomially computable. It is easy to check also that it is polynomially continuous.
We will use a variant F ′ of the function F of Section 7, where the functions Fi for
the allocations are modified as follows. Step 5 for all pairs j, k of goods, and steps 6,
and 7 for all triples j, k, l are applied all independently in parallel to the allocation that
results after step 4. In order for the allocation to remain feasible (i.e. have xij ≥ 0 for
all i, j), we change line 5a in F ′i to d ← min{
xij
3 , (pj − pk)+}, change line 6a to d ←
min{ xik3n2 , ((uil − uik)(pk − pj) − (uik − uij)(pl − pk))+}, and we change line 7a to d ←
min{ xij3n2 ,
xil
3n2 , ((uik − uij)(pl − pk)− (uil − uik)(pk − pj))+}. In this way, a coordinate xij
can be decreased by the operations of step 5 for all pairs j, k at most by xij/3 in total, and
the same is true for the total decrease from the operations of steps 6 and 7 for all triples
involving good j; therefore, the coordinates xij remain nonnegative. The function for the
prices remains the same as before. All the properties shown in Section 7 for F hold also
for F ′. The family F ′ of these functions F ′I is clearly also polynomially computable and
polynomially continuous.
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Let I be a given instance of the matching market problem. Every utility uij is a rational
number, without loss of generality in [0, 1], which is given as the ratio of two integers
represented in binary. Let m be the maximum number of bits needed to represent a utility.
Note that every nonzero uij is at least 1/2m and the difference between any two unequal
utilities is at least 1/22m. Given a positive rational ε (wlog in [0, 1]), let δ = ε/(n1026m).
Note that log(1/δ) is bounded by a polynomial in |I| and log(1/ε). We show the following:
I Lemma 24. Every weak δ-approximate fixed point of F ′I is a relaxed ε-approximate
equilibrium of the market I.
The proof follows and adapts the proof in Section 7 of the analogous statement for the
exact fixed points. The proof is rather involved; we refer to the full paper for the details. As
a consequence of Lemma 24 and Proposition 21 we have:
I Theorem 25. The problem of computing an ε-approximate equilibrium of a given matching
market is in PPAD.
9 Discussion
As stated in the Introduction, a conclusive proof of intractability of the HZ scheme, via
either a proof of FIXP-hardness for exact equilibrium or PPAD-hardness for approximate
equilibrium, has eluded us. One of the difficulties is the following: Optimal bundles of agents
in an HZ equilibrium may include zero-utility zero-priced goods as “fillers” to satisfy the
size constraint, e.g., observe their use in our Algorithm for the case of dichotomous utilities.
In this easy setting, we knew which were the “filler” goods. However, when faced with a
complex instance of HZ, we don’t a priori know which zero-utility goods will be used as
“fillers”. Therefore, even though an agent may have very few positive utility goods, other
goods are also in play, thereby giving no “control” on the equilibrium outcome.
We propose exploring the following avenue, in addition to the usual ones, for arriving
at evidence of intractability: Relax the notion of polynomial time reducibility suitably and
obtain a weaker result than FIXP-hardness or PPAD-hardness.
Other open problems related to our work are: obtain efficient algorithms for computing
approximate equilibria, suitably defined, and identify other special cases, besides the bi-valued
case, for which equilibrium is easy to compute. Additionally, generalizations and variants of
the HZ scheme deserve attention, most importantly to two-sided matching markets [14].
Encouraged by success on the bi-valued utilities case, we considered its generalization to
the tri-valued utilities case, in particular, {0, 12 , 1} utilities. We believe even this case has
instances with only irrational equilibria. Finding such an example or proving rationality is
non-trivial and we leave it as an open problem. Furthermore, it will not be surprising if even
this case is intractable; resolving this is a challenging open problem.
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